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Abstract 
Policy mix analysis has been applied in research on energy, climate, urban and transport 
policy, and more recently biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services.   However, 
policy mix analysis has thus far been employed at a high conceptual level, focusing on 
describing interactions between instrument types.  Policy mix analysis rarely describes 
instrument ‘structure’ or functional characteristics, in a way that would answer the question 
“what constitutes an instrument”?  We describe how the rules-in-use taxonomy of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, developed for research on 
common pool resource management, can be used to characterise conservation policy 
instrument interactions. We demonstrate the approach on the well-known Costa Rica’s PES 
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program and cross-compliance policies, arguing that PES is a policy mix rather than a single 
economic instrument.  Our analysis shows how design features of payments for ecosystem 
services (PES) described in the economics literature maps to ‘rules-in-use’ in the IAD 
framework.   It illustrates that the framework provides a terminology for defining what 
constitutes institutional context, comparing economic, regulatory and information 
instruments, and studying their interactions. The rules-in-use taxonomy of IAD is a 
‘structural’ diagnostic approach, which needs to be combined with other tools that analyse 
more the role and  ‘agency’ of actors, as part of integrative environmental governance 
research.   
Keywords: payment for ecosystem services (PES), economic instrument, market-based 
instrument (MBI), integrative environmental governance, Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD), rules-in-use, functional role, Costa Rica. 
1. Introduction 
Policy mix analysis has been applied by research on energy, climate, urban and transport 
policy, and more recently biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services.   However, 
policy mix analysis has been employed at a high conceptual level, focusing on describing 
interactions between instrument types(Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998; OECD, 2007; 
Flanagan et al., 2010; Schröter-Schlaack and Ring, 2011).  Policy mix analysis rarely 
describes instrument ‘structure’ or functional characteristics, in a way that would answer the 
question “what constitutes an instrument”? Using Costa Rica’s well known Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) as an example, this paper aims to demonstrate how the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom, 2005) can contribute  to policy mix 
analysis and the wider research field of integrative environmental governance (Visseren-
Hamakers, 2015).  
Ring and Barton (2015) review the development of policy mix literature.  Policy mix emerged 
in economic policy literature in the 1960s concerning the interaction of fiscal and monetary 
policy (Flanagan et al., 2010). Since the 90s policy mix analysis has be taken up in international 
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research on biodiversity conservation and environmental policy (Gunningham and Young, 
1997; Young, 2002), air pollution and climate change policies (Sorrell and Sijm, 2003; 
Lehmann, 2012; Kivimaa and Kern, 2016), resource efficiency (Bicket and Vanner, 2016; 
Bontoux and Bengtsson, 2016; Ekvall et al., 2016) and sustainability research (Kivimaa and 
Kern, 2016).  In the field of biodiversity and ecosystem policies, Ring and Schröter-Schlaack 
(2011) define a policy mix as “a combination of policy instruments, which has evolved to 
influence the quantity and quality of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem service provision 
in public and private sectors”.    
Similar concepts to policy mix analysis exist in a diversity environmental research fields. A 
non-exhaustive list of examples include, ‘institutional blending’ of public-private ownership 
and contracting (Hodge and Adams, 2013),  ‘policy coherence’(Howlett and Rayner, 2007; 
Makkonen et al., 2015), ‘second-best theory’ of multiple policy instruments (Bennear and 
Stavins, 2007), ‘hybrid instruments’ mixing price and quantity mechanisms (Hepburn, 2006), 
‘overlapping policy instruments’ addressing the same policy objective (Lecuyer and Quirion, 
2013), ‘optimal mixes’ in integrated conservation and development projects (Minang and van 
Noordwijk, 2013),’mixes of policy mechanisms’ in a public-private benefit framework 
(Pannell, 2008), ‘mix of institutional types’ in governance of commons (Dietz et al., 2003), 
environmental ‘policy diversification’ (Brock and Carpenter, 2007), ‘policyscapes’ (Barton et 
al., 2013; Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016), ‘mix of actions and outcomes’ (Derissen and Quaas, 
2013), ‘polycentric governance’ in multifunctional landscapes (Nagendra and Ostrom, 2012),  
‘institutional diversity’ (Ostrom, 2005), and ‘hybrids’ in business pooling, contracting and 
competition (Hagedorn, 2008).  
Policy mix analysis is also an emerging area of analysis in the journal of Environmental Policy 
and Governance (Klassert and Möckel, 2013; Jordan et al., 2014; Kivimaa and Virkamaki, 
2014; dos Santos et al., 2015; Mahzouni, 2015). Klassert and Möckel (2013) analyse the 
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constraints and opportunities for introducing further market-based instruments in conjunction 
with existing policies under the EU Birds and Habitats Directive and Common Agricultural 
Policy. Jordan et al. (2014) evaluate a federal level policy mix to overcome the barriers of small 
and medium-sized enterprises to resource efficiency innovation in Germany.  Kivimaa and 
Virkamaki (2014) analyse the intended paths towards low-carbon transport systems in Finland 
with multiple policies. Santos et al. (2015) evaluate the mix of European agri-environmental 
measures directed at private landowners and ecological fiscal transfers directed at local 
governments for improved land-use zoning and land management practices in Portugal.  
Mazouni (2015) analyses the policy mix for a transition towards energy efficient buidings in a 
city district of Stockholm Sweden.  Our reading of this substantially and conceptually broad 
environmental policy and governance literature is that policy mix analysis lacks a common 
terminology for describing what constitutes the functional characteristics of instruments.   
Addressing the impacts of policy instruments, economic instruments for biodiversity 
conservation have been compared in terms of their legitimacy, environmental effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness(OECD, 2007; Angelsen, 2009; Ring and Schröter-Schlaack, 2011; Vatn et 
al., 2011). Yet, as the analytical approach of these studies compares economic instruments in 
terms of their outcomes, they pay little attention to the functional characteristics of the 
instruments themselves.  Although these studies point out that institutional and socio-ecological 
context influences instrument choice and implementation, they do not offer descriptors of the 
institutional context factors that potentially interact with the instruments’ functional 
characteristics. We take this analytical void in the policy mix research as our starting point. 
Payment for ecosystem services - a hybrid instrument as a case study 
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) is a much debated economic instrument for biodiversity 
conservation which serves as the empirical setting of this paper. Based on a review of different 
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PES definitions across academic traditions Wunder (2015) defines and ‘ideal type’ of PES as 
(1) voluntary transactions, (2) between service users, (3) and service providers, (4) that are 
conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management, (5) for generating offsite services.  
There is strong debate about whether PES should be classified as market-based in practice or 
neoliberal in intent.  Wunder (2015) notes that the classification of PES has at times been used 
to argue for or against market-based instruments versus apparent alternatives in a normative 
fashion.  Early PES research has noted that context matters for the interpretation of PES’ 
impacts (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002) .   The growing literature on the classification of PES 
also emphasises the need to characterise context (Wunder, 2005; Porras et al., 2008; 
Sommerville et al., 2009; Swallow et al., 2009; Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010; Karsenty, 
2011; Shelley, 2011; Pirard, 2012; Tacconi, 2012; van Noordwijk et al., 2012; Wunder, 2015; 
Hausknost et al., 2017; Huber-Stearns et al., 2017). Syntheses of PES findings increasingly 
point to institutional and socio-ecological contextual factors in explaining its impacts (Wunder, 
2006.; Wunder et al., 2008; Angelsen, 2009; Greiber, 2009; Muradian et al., 2010; Pascual et 
al., 2010; Vatn, 2010; Ferraro, 2011; Corbera, 2015; Raes et al., 2016).  Impact assessments of 
PES have recently included administrative heterogeneity and presence of other instruments 
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2012; Pfaff and Robalino, 2012; Robalino et al., 2015).  Fletcher and 
Buscher (2017) note that much of the recent literature (Vatn, 2010; Dempsey and Robertson, 
2012; Pirard and Lapeyre, 2014; Gomez-Baggethun and Muradian, 2015; Van Hecken et al., 
2015)  argues that PES is not a market instrument or neoliberal because of the substantial mix 
of public funding and regulation of PES implemention on the ground. Yet, the interaction 
between the institutional context factors and the design of the PES arrangements has not been 




The intention of this paper is not to offer another definition of PES (Wunder, 2005; Muradian 
et al., 2010; Fletcher and Breitling, 2012; Pirard, 2012; Pirard and Lapeyre, 2014; Wunder, 
2015), nor an interpretation of its ideological objectives (Dempsey and Robertson, 2012; 
Matulis, 2012; Matulis, 2016; Fletcher and Buscher, 2017), we focus our attention on describing 
PES’ institutional context and interaction with other policy instruments.  Just like any successful 
new policy instruments, enduring PES regimes have resulted from processes of adaptation and 
co-evolution with the existing policy mixes(Primmer et al., 2015; Ring and Barton, 2015).  For 
example, PES may have an explicit role in a broader conservation instrument mix, making 
general restrictions more ‘palatable’, through temporary compensations for expropriated 
property owners in newly created protected areas, or they can provide alternative means of 
income generation for people displaced around protected areas (Porras et al. 2011). Rather than 
as compensation for strongly implemented regulatory policies, PES may complement 
insufficient or weakly enforced forest laws.  PES may compete with subsidies for forestry and 
forest clearing, or be part of a cross-compliance scheme for example tied to credit (Wunder et 
al., 2008).    PES may follow a policy sequence replacing or being integrated into pre-existing 
conservation and development projects (Wunder, 2006.), or develop from a subsidy scheme 
towards a performance-based scheme (Fletcher and Breitling, 2012; Matulis, 2012).  PES have 
also been developed as a reaction to a failed regulatory approach that has neither generated the 
envisioned conservation outcomes, nor gained legitimacy(Primmer et al., 2013).   
 
An analytical framework for policy mixes 
Wunder (2015) makes a case for ‘ideal type’ definitions of PES that are consistent and precise, 
distinctive in function, robust to inter-temporal variations and simple enough to remember.  We 
would add that the definition of PES should be comparable to the characteristics of other 
conservation instruments using a common typology. Fletcher and Bluscher (2017) call for 
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investigation of common elements in PES design, rather than emphasising particularities of 
implementation.  We would add that a typology identifying commonalities across economic, 
regulatory and information instruments is needed. Our main concern in this paper therefore is 
to test a framework that identifies the functional characteristics of instruments as a basis for 
comparison and analysis of interaction.  The decomposition of instrument characteristics is 
intended to support discussion of conservation policy instrument characteristics in terms of their 
function, without the need for normative instrument labels. 
Ostrom (1990) defined institutions as “the set of working rules that are used to determine who 
is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what 
aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or 
must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their 
actions”.   Ostrom (2005) argued that a large number of different resource use situations – or 
‘action situations’ – may be described by a limited set of rules for cooperative governance. In 
her Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, she proposes that the same types 
of rules also define cooperative institutions at different hierarchical levels.  Vatn (2010) 
discusses the institutional characteristics of PES.   Framing conservation policy instruments as 
institutions, Ring and Barton (2015) suggested that the ‘rules-in-use’ taxonomy of the IAD 
framework could serve as a detailed approach to classifying functional characteristics of 
economic instruments in a policy mix.  They argued that the IAD framework allows wider 
comparison with regulatory and information instruments, as well as the common pool property 
resource management institutions that gave rise to IAD. The approach is inspired by diagnostic 
multilevel analysis of institutions (Ostrom, 2007; Cox et al., 2010; Cox, 2011) and employing 
a ‘grammar’ of institutional analysis (Basurto et al., 2010).  In this paper, we aim to show how 
the analysis of formal rules-in-use can avoid the “instrument labelling” debate by describing 
the functional characteristics of instruments such as PES, and conservation instruments more 
8 
 
widely. To our knowledge our paper is the first application of the ‘rules-in-use’ aspect of the 
IAD framework to the analysis of economic instruments in conservation, using Costa Rica’s 
PES as a demonstration case.  In our further analysis we use the Spanish abbreviation (PSA) - 
pagos por servicios ambientales – to identify Costa Rica’s program, and PES when referring to 
definitions and cases in the international literature.    
 
The paper is laid out as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the Costa Rica Forest Law and PSA 
program used to test IAD framework as a diagnostic tool for functional and interaction analysis.  
We then present the IAD analytical framework and its ‘rules-in-use’ as functional 
characteristics of PES.  To get started we show how the framework maps to a simple ideal type 
definition of PES.  We then describe how IAD can be used a generic tool for classifying 
functional characteristics of conservation instruments.  In section 3, we demonstrate the 
application of IAD ‘rules-in-use’ classification to Costa Rica’s PSA by mapping design features 
cited in the literature to the ‘rules-in-use’ classification of IAD.  Our analysis illustrates how 
PSA could be called a policy mix of incentives, addressing different compliance and land-use 
situations, as well as environmental and rural development policy goals. In section 4 we discuss 
limitations and potential of the IAD framework for instrument analysis, and how the ‘policy 
mix’ framing of PES opens different avenues for the analysis of instrument interaction.  Section 






2. Analysis frameworks and methods 
2.1 A diagnostic method for policy mix analysis – the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework   
 
The IAD framework proposes that the functional role of rules-in-use in cooperative institutions 
is understood in relation to ‘action situations’ involving particular actors and actions (Ostrom, 
2005; Poteete et al., 2010).   Ostrom (2005) makes a distinction between organisations and 
institutions.  Institutions encompass ‘rules-in-use’ at different levels of organisation, while 
organisations are made up of actors who have different roles according to rules-in-use (both 
formal and informal).  Our framing of ‘rules-in-use’ as the functional characteristics of 
conservation instruments, suggests that they could serve both as a terminology to describe the 
instrument that is the focus of analysis, but also the ‘wider institutional context’ understood as 
the formal and assumed roles of actors in organisations. 
 
The IAD framework’s ‘rules-in-use’ taxonomy include position, boundary, information, 












  Table 1 Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
IAD Rule Description 
Boundary rules Who is eligible; entry rules; succession rules; exit rules. Defining holder 
and nonholders of positions. 
Payoff rules Assign external rewards and sanctions to particular actions or to particular 
readings on outcome of state variables. 
Position rules Decision-making positions that actors can fill and which are assigned 
action sets at particular decision-making junctures. Multiple positions are 
possible for individual actors. 
Choice rules Required, permitted and forbidden actions at a particular time based on 
conditions that have or have not been met. 
Scope rules Known outcome variable(s) that must, must not, or may be affected by 
action (i.e. policy goals).  Define which variables are observed and their 
range (includes intermediate and final outcomes in the ‘policy cycle’). 
Information 
rules 
Affect level of information available to participants about; Overall 
structure of situation, current state of resource, previous and current 
experience of others’ participation, own past moves (channels, frequency 
accuracy, subject of communication, official language). 
Aggregation 
rules 
Whether decision requires single or multiple participants. Lack of 
agreement rules. 




Boundary rules govern the entry, succession and exit of landusers in a particular instrument 
regime.    Payoff rules identify the rewards and sanctions associated with outcomes of actions. 
Payoff rules encompass all incentives rather than just a narrow focus on payment conditions.  
Position rules determine decision-making positions, such as the types and roles of 
intermediaries.   Choice rules define required, permitted, forbidden and guaranteed actions on 
particular types of land. Scope rules define outcome variables and their ranges, such as the 
maintenance of forest cover as a proxy for a bundle of ecosystem services. Information rules 
govern information access and disclosure. Aggregation rules refer to collective voting rules and 
lack of agreement rules governing an instrument regime.     
 
The rules are inter-related with specific function, which are context specific – or in IAD 
language are specific to an ‘action situation’ (Figure 1) (Ostrom, 2005).  An ‘action situation’ 
is a land-use decision to be taken for example by a landuser in a forest location.   In the ‘action 
situation’ participants and actions are assigned to positions.  Outcomes are linked to actions.  
Information is available about action-outcome linkages.  Control is excercised over action-
outcome linkages.  Costs and benefits for actors are outcomes from acting according to sets of 






Ostrom (2005) defines a default condition with no rules, which under a common-law system 
presumes general freedom unless a rule specifically prohibits or mandates an act or event.  
Ostrom’s default rule-less conditions have many features in common with assumptions of a 
perfect market (where property rights are the sine qua non rule).  In an ideal type, performance-
based instruments place emphasis on defining scope rules about what target to meet, and pay-
off rules for achieving those targets.  This implies that actors are left to choose how to achieve 
targets, rather than choice rules being specified.  Regulatory or command-and-control 
instruments place emphasis on choice rules regarding how a policy target is to be met – for 
example which land-use practices are permitted or prohibited. Regulatory instruments also have 
pay-off rules through definition of sanctions.   Information-based instruments by definition 
place emphasis on information rules, with information provided to “nudge” (Hiedanpää and 
 
Figure 1.  Action situation in the Institutional Analysis and Development(IAD) framework 
could be used to characterise policy instruments for biodiversity conservation. (Source: 
Ring and Barton (2015) adapted from Ostrom 2005). To Ostrom’s original ‘rules-in-use’ 





Bromley, 2014) any aspect of an action situation (scope, choices, payoffs, boundary rules etc.).   
From this discussion we see how the IAD framing can be used to distinguish between  ‘ideal 
types’ of conservation instruments in general, and payment for ecosystem service in particular, 
as defined by Wunder (2015).  Furthermore, rules-in-use are sufficiently generic to describe 
other instruments applied in conjunction and for cross-compliance purposes (Ring and Barton, 
2015).   We note that Bollman and Hardy (2012) used the transactions cost1 and institutional 
performance benchmarks2 aspects of the IAD framework to assess “Pagos por Servicios 
Ambientales” (PSA) in Costa Rica, but did not take advantage of the rules-in-use aspects of the 
framework. 
2.2 Demonstration case – the Costa Rican Forest Law and PES 
 
Costa Rica’s payments for ecosystem services program is a very well-known, analysed and 
publicised case of PES that have been used to set and discuss PES definitions (Rojas and 
Aylward, 2003; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder et al., 2008; Daniels et al., 2010) and normative 
characteristics and ideologies of PES (Fletcher and Breitling, 2012; Matulis, 2012; Matulis, 
2016). However, PSA case analysis has not lead to consensus on the nature of this instrument. 
PSA provides a rich example of research broadening over time to consider policy context 
(Pagiola, 2008; Daniels et al., 2010; Le Coq et al., 2010; Porras et al., 2011; Robalino et al., 
2011; Fletcher and Breitling, 2012; Matulis, 2012; Le Coq et al., 2013; Rosendal and Schei, 
2014; Robalino et al., 2015; Matulis, 2016).  Thus PSA is a good case to demonstrate a 
framework that endeavours to go beyond ideological debate on PES instruments.  
PSA (legal / and institutional) background were set in the Costa Rican Forest Law (No 
7575, 1996)   that establishes ‘incentives’ to monetarily compensate conservation, reforestation 
                                                 
1 Information, coordination and strategic costs 
2 economic efficiency, fiscal equivalence, redistributional equity, accountability, conformance to the value of 
local actors and sustainability 
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and regeneration actions that provide ‘environmental services’.  Environmental services 
covered by the law include mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions; hydrological services, 
including provision of water for human consumption, irrigation, and energy production; 
biodiversity conservation; and provision of scenic beauty for recreation and ecotourism. The 
terminology “pagos por servicios ambientales” (PSA) is not used in the text of the Forest Law, 
which refers to “incentivos” both regarding monetary compensation for different conservation 
activities, as well tax exemptions and enforcement of tenure security. The same Forest Law that 
establishes PSA bans landuse change in forests3. Exceptions can be granted for housing and 
infrastructure for the purpose of ecotourism, infrastructure of national interest, natural hazard 
mitigation and forest fire prevention.  “Pago de servicios ambientales” (PSA) – payments for 
environmental services - was first introduced as a legal term in art. 37 of the Biodiversity Law 
(7788, 1998). Different payment modalities in PSA exist for different conservation actions in 
different parts of the landuse mosaic, including forest protection, reforestation, forest 
regeneration, forest management and agroforestry (Pagiola, 2008; Daniels et al., 2010)   .  PSA 
modalities have been increasingly diversified to address different landuse change contexts 
across a landscape mosaic (Le Coq et al., 2013).  Most research attention has focused on the 
‘protection modality’ as it in recent years constitutes roughly 90% of the area contracted under 
the program(Daniels et al., 2010; Porras et al., 2013).  In this paper we use the characteristics 
of “forest protection” modality of PSA to demonstrate the IAD framework’s rules-in-use as a 
diagnostic tool.  Development of “forest protection” PSA can be divided into three major phases 
(Porras et al., 2013);  
Phase I - conservation area priority-setting (1997-2002): Spatial criteria were specific 
to locations within each conservation area and determined by the National System of 
Conservation Areas (SINAC) their local area offices individually. Revision of decrees shows a 
                                                 
3 art19. Law No7575 
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wide range of different criteria terminology applied across different conservation areas. With 
such a wide range of spatial criteria defined by SINAC they did not represent effective spatial 
targeting.   In 1999 spatial priorities differentiated by PSA modality were introduced for the 
first time.  During this period applications meeting the criteria were selected on a first-come-
first-served basis.   
Phase II - priority-setting at regional level (2003-2010): From 2003, the National Forest 
Fund of Costa Rica (FONAFIFO) assumes full management of the PSA programme including 
selection of PES beneficiary (Robalino et al., 2011). Spatial targeting criteria were reduced to 
a handful of criteria.   Criteria were not applied in order of importance. Contracts were selected 
on a first-come-first-evaluated-basis and then prioritised4. The first non-environmental criteria, 
in the form of low Human Development Index was introduced. Regional FONAFIFO offices 
each had their PSA area quotas to fill per modality.   
Phase III - priority-setting at national level (2011-present):   In 2011, the system of first-
come-first evaluated was dropped. In its place, a matrix of weights per priority-setting criteria 
was introduced and used to select among “pre-applications”.  A criteria for priority to small 
farms is introduced to improve distributional equity.  Moreover regional quotas were dropped 
in favour of a national level priority-setting across all “pre-applications” using weighting of 
criteria. 
Our brief description of PSA has emphasises how the program has changed over two decades, 
adopting and discarding different policy objectives and mechanisms.  
 
2.3 Materials 
We made an initial identification of PES design features based on a highly cited international 
review of 13 PES cases that include user-financed, government financed and PES-like programs 
                                                 
4 Pers.com. Oscar Sanchez, FONAFIFO, January 2013 
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(Wunder et al., 2008).  As an initial test we mapped these design criteria to the rules-in-use 
definitions of the IAD framework. We then augmented the list of international PES 
characteristics with those specific to the Costa Rica PSA program, based on a review of research 
in Costa Rica, as documented in Porras et al. (2013) and Barton et al. (2014). The identification 
of ‘rules-in-use’ focused on the “forest protection” modality of PSA.  It was based on a review 
of the Forest Law #7575 and Biodiversity Law #7788, and all Presidential Decrees on PSA 
from 1997-2013 (Table 1).  We also carried out an analysis of the PSA Procedures Manual 
(FONAFIFO, 2009) to identify the integration of cross-compliance rules with PSA.  This 
included comparing the pre-selection criteria for evaluating the property titles of PSA 
applicants’ for their consistency with cadastre and national property registers.  Cadastre criteria 
were tested against a case study for the Osa and Nicoya Peninsulas, Costa Rica, and discussed 
in a workshop with FONAFIFO regional staff, as documented by Benavides et al. (2014).    
Based on this information we constructed a draft diagnostic of the IAD framework ’rules-in-
use’ of the forest protection PSA.  A draft diagnostic of PSA in terms of ‘rules-in-use’ was 
discussed with the director of FONAFIFO Oscar Sanchez and revised based on feedback.   
3. Application and results 
3.1 Simple mapping of PES ‘ideal type’ to the IAD framework  
As a starting point we revisit Wunder’s (2015) PES “ideal type” as (1) voluntary transactions, 
(2) between service users, (3) and service providers, (4) that are conditional on agreed rules of 
natural resource management, (5) for generating offsite services.   The ideal type PES definition 






Table 2   PES ideal type characterized by IAD rules-in-use  
 
Source: PES definition based on Wunder (2015)  
 
In PES ideal type definition, entry, succession and exit of landusers are voluntary (boundary 
rule).   The payoff  rules includes many types of transaction including monetary payments, 
compensations, rewards and also sanctions conditional on outcomes of actions.  The essential 
positions are service provider and user (because PES is voluntary, actors are usually, but not 
necessarily private). Additional positions might include those of interpreting and assigning 
rules by actors who manage PES, or function as an intermediary. These positions can be held 
by the public sector administration or some other organisation (Vatn, 2010; Primmer et al., 
2013). Agreed choice rules of natural resource management define required, permitted, 
forbidden and guaranteed actions on particular types of land.  Scope rules define off-site 
ecosystem services as the outcome variable of interest, although transaction costs often mean 
that the transaction is conditional on following agreed rules for resource management. 
 
 
3.2 Detailed mapping of PSA characteristics to the IAD framework  
The simple ideal type mapping (Table 2) can be expanded to consider the detailed 
characteristics of Costa Rica’s PSA program.   Table 3 maps PSA characteristics first in terms 
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of frequently cited PES ‘design features’ (Wunder et al., 2008) and then using the IAD 
framework terminology.  The detailed description is based on identification of ‘rules-in-use’ 
from the Forest Law that created PSA, the annual presidential decrees determining PSA 
priorities and the PSA Operational Manual.   
 
The forest conversion ban in the Forest Law 7575 is a general choice rule banning forest 
clearing with a few exceptions.    Landuse change with intent is illegal and punishable by prison 
sentences of up to 3 years (payoff rule).  Private forest owners ‘who manage their forests’ 
through PSA or in protected areas are exempt for property taxes (payoff rule)5, which can make 
a significant impact on the property owner given recent re-valuation as part of property tax 
reform. Participation in PSA also provides a guarantee of public eviction of squatters6, which 
is a non-monetary pay-off rule in providing additional tenure security which is not always 
guaranteed by the State, particular at the time the Forest Law was introduced. Other choice 
rules reinforce prohibitions through passive obligations, such as the conserving buffer zones 
required by the Forest Law7. Despite being non-action obligations, forest in buffer zones are 
counted as part of the PSA contracted area and subject to compensation (pay off  rule) 
(FONAFIFO, 2009).  Finally, PSA contracts require specific and additional actions.  For 
example, payments in the PSA ‘protection modality are conditional on establishing fire breaks, 
fencing, sign posting and stopping poachers from illegal hunting and logging on one’s property 
(pay off  rule).    There is has been a trend in recent years to make contracts longer i.a. to reduce 
transaction costs of re-application (boundary rules).  
 
                                                 
5 Art. 23 Forest Law 7575 
6 Art. 36 Forest Law 7575 
7 Art. 33 Forest Law 7575. 100m around natural springs, 10-15 m along rivers and streams, 50 meters around 
lakes, variable distance in recharge zones. 
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use   
Instrument characteristics as identified by 
PES ideal type# , review* of PES cases  
Examples of rules-in-use in Costa Rican PSA 




1. Voluntary  
2. Spatial scale/planning area* 
3. Tenure security cross-compliance * 
4. Social security cross compliance 
5. Pre-application ranking criteria  
6. Length of contract 
7. Contract renewal criteria 
8. Contract cancellation criteria 
9. Agglomeration bonuses or minimum contiguous area 
requirements for collective PES contracts 
[…] 
1. Private land-owners, previously also cooperatives 
2. Previously regional, now national ranking & selection 
3. PSA promotes legal property or possession  
4. Social security payment of employees  
5. FONAFIFO pre- application ranking criteria (Table 4) 
6. Fixed term contract (10 years) 
7. Same as for first time applicants 
8. Land title inconsistencies; Lacking protection measures 
(not enforced)  
9. Minimum area requirement, agglomeration 
encouraged by prioritizing biological corridors 
10. Cooperative group contracting (until 2002) 
 
Payoff rules 1. Conditionality* 
2. Transaction*  
3. Payment principle (incentive, compensation, reward, 
tax exemptions)* 
4. Payment schedule*  
5. Intermediaries’ fees* 
6. Administrative fees 
7. Contract-to-payment delay 
8. Fines, other sanctions* 
[…] 
1. Conditional on maintaining forest cover; renewal 
conditional on eligibility 
2. Monetary payment  
3. Differentiated payments for ES and biodiversity, real 
value less than opportunity costs; exemption from 
property taxes; compensation of non-expropriated 
properties within national parks 
4. Fixed payment per year 1-5,  
5. Regulated to maximum 18% of contract amount 
6. FONAFIFO charges 0,6% of contract amount for 
registration 
7. Several months 
8. Contract cancellation and reimbursement.  Fines and 
jail under Forest Law for deforestation. 
Position 
rules  
1. Instrument initiator* 
2. Financing sources*  
3. External donor support* 
4. Priority-setting policy maker 
     4.1 Target, annual objectives  
     4.2 Priority and eligibility criteria 







8.4. Monitoring and reporting 
9. Verification (3rd party) 
[…] 
1. Forest Fund (FONAFIFO) 
2. Public: Earmarked taxes, water fees; Private: CTO sale  
3. External donor (GEF and World Bank).  
4.1 MINAET-FONAFIFO 
4.2 Multi-sectoral board of FONAFIFO 
5. Forest Fund (FONAFIFO), water utilities, hydropower 
companies, individuals 
6. State, private companies, households 
7. Forest landholder; physical person;  anonymous legal 
entity; cooperative group (previously) 
8.1 Forest engineer (regente) & landholder self-selection 
8.2 Forest engineer (regente): self-employed or NGO 
8.3. N/A 
8.4. Forest engineer (regente): self-employed or NGO 
9. Conservation authorities (SINAC)  
 
Choice rules 1. Agreed rules of natural resource management : 
1.1 Prohibitions (cross compliance) 
1.2. Permissions (land uses proxies for ES)* 
1.3. Guarantees 
1.4. Obligations (cross compliance) 
[…] 
1.1. Landuse change prohibition, timber extraction, any 
hunting, residence 
1.2. Recreation  
1.3. Squatter eviction, title enforcement, no enforced 
conservation on site 
1.4. Management procedures defined for conservation 
measures.   Maintained forest cover; fire breaks, fencing, 
signposting, conservation of riparian buffer zones 
 
Scope rules 1. Externalities / Services(property level)* 
2. Baseline scenario* 
3. Aggregate conservation target (national level) 
1. Area-based forest cover proxies for biodiversity (on-
site) and water, landscape aesthetics, carbon (off-site)  
2. Forest cover evaluation every 10 yrs, no control group 
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4. Budget (national level) 
[…] 
3. Annual area targets for conservation, reforestation, 
trees in agroforestry set according to budget, 
determined by REDD+ carbon partnership 
4. Stable earmarked tax funds; less stable donor funds, 
and private purchase  
Information 
rules 
1. Tenure documentation 
2. Free prior informed consent (FPIC) 
3. Public hearing processes.  
4. Freedom of information 
5. Monitoring,  reporting* 
 and verification (MRV) requirements  
[…] 
1. Grace periods for obtaining tenure documentation 
2. Yes, criteria openly available, but require specialist 
interpretation 
3. No public hearing process on contract selection 
criteria (determined by FONAFIFO board).  
4. Applications not listed, contracts listed, but not 
mapped.  Owners of anonymous legal entities cannot be 
identified. Not strict interpretation of privacy of forest 
owner information. 




1. Collective participation  
2. Consensus or majority rules on priority setting, 
selection criteria etc. 
3. Lack of agreement rules.   
4. Complaints procedures.   
[…] 
1. Cooperatives no longer eligible.   Few landowners are 
members of cooperatives or forest associations. 
2.Criteria developed by FONAFIFO and approved by their 
board  
3. Non-negotiable contract conditions. 
4. None regarding PSA selection process 
Note: types of cross-compliance & instrument integration :  
 
fiscal:       protected areas:  social, tenure:    
 
 
#Ideal type PES criteria by Wunder (2015) marked in bold.   * indicates PES characteristics used in a review of PES 
cases by Wunder et al. (2008). Porras et al. (2013) and Barton et al. (2014) for further documentation of the detailed 
characteristics right hand column) of PSA. FONAFIFO – National Forestry Financing Fund 
 
 
3.2  An analysis of changing rules-in-use over time  
Long-standing PES programs develop and change over time (Primmer et al., 2013; Raes et al., 
2016)  .   In this section, we provide an example of analysing instrument development in terms 
of rules-in-use.  Table 4 is based on the analysis of presidential decrees since 1997 describing 
the year-to-year changes in the formal pre-selection criteria for PSA applicants.   Boundary 
rules define eligibility of the individual application. Boundary rules also include other 
instruments of social, tenure and protected area policies in the design of PSA.    By 2013, PSA 
boundary rules were based on a mixture of landowner and landuse characteristics.     The 
development of priority-criteria over time has moved PSA forest protection from a conservation 
instrument to complement protected areas, to a conservation and rural development policy mix 
instrument (Le Coq et al., 2013).  PSA spatial targeting both strengthened protection in publicly 
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designated protected areas, as well spatially complementing protected areas and indigenous 
territories through targeting of biological corridors and conservation gaps.  
 
The hierarchical nature of PSA from national to property level poses some room for 
interpretation in terms the rules-in-use framework.  For the PSA program at the national level 
the annual budget and total land areas assigned to a particular modality constitute scope rules, 
which when translated into boundary rules at property level defines aggregate eligibility.   The 
minimum points needed for an applications to be approved varies year on year depending on 
the available total budget, quality and number of competing applications.  This weighting and 
scoring system can be interpreted as a collective choice aggregation rule.
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Table 4  Evolution of PSA pre-application selection criteria for “forest protection” modality – interactions with other policy instruments 
  
  Phase I: conservation area  
priority-setting 
Phase II: regional  
priority-setting  
Phase III: national 
priority-setting 
 Year: 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 Presidential Decree #: 25828 
26141 





































                
Indigenous territories            R R W W W 
Protected areas             R R W W W 
Biological corridors (GRUAS, CBM)            R R W W W 
Conservation gaps (GRUAS II)            R R W W W 
Forest protecting water resources               W W W 
Ecomercados#, KfWproject areas                 
Non-priority forest               W W W 
Low IDS (<40%)            R R W W W 
Cooperative group contracting                 
Property register & title                 
Social security regularization                 
Non-expropriated properties             R R    
Expiring forest mngt PSA            R R W   
Expiring contract this yr.              W W W 
Expired PSA contract            R R W   
Expired CAFMA >10yrs                 
Contracts, properties <50 ha              W W W 
Comments:      Criteria/ Boundary rule in force.   Boundary rules defined by other instruments: protected areas  social, tenure  
Scope rules:  R –  system of ranked criteria.  W –  system of weighted criteria and aggregate scoring; minimum score threshold to 




3.3  Describing instrument cross-compliance in the IAD framework 
 
The PSA Operations Manual (FONAFIFO, 2009) specifies legal conditions that must 
be met regarding property titles being correctly registered in the National Register and 
being consistent with the national property cadastre. A number of cadastral 
inconsistencies can delay or disqualify PSA applications (Benavides et al., 2014)8,  
acting de jure as boundary rules although they are not all made explicit in the Operations 
Manual (Table S1 Supplementary Material).  The national property register and cadaster 
is both a guarantor of tenure rights, and an information-based instrument in its own right, 
acting as a certification for PSA eligibility.   
 
FONAFIFO personnel argue that PSA is an effective tool for land tenure regularisation9.  
This cross-compliance argument runs counter to a Coasian view that property rights are 
a necessary precondition for market-based instruments such as PSA (Pagiola, 2008).   
The Operations Manual provides detailed information on grace periods for obtaining 
necessary tenure documentation to resume the application process (information rules).  
Applicants may also qualify if they can document posessionary rights, but the process 
of documentation and witnesses is laborious.  Smallholder applicants may choose to pay 
surveyor and legal services to obtain formal title, sometimes borrowing money in 
informal credit markets against the first PSA payment10. How important PSA is for 
tenure regularization beyond examples cited here remains to be studied.    
                                                 
8 Table S1 in Supplementary material describes which cadastral inconsistencies can lead to rejection of 
PSA applications. 
9 Personal communication Oscar Sanchez, FONAFIFO 





Another example of cross-compliance boundary rule which has not been previously 
documented is the requirement that PSA participants have no outstanding debts with the 
national social security system (FONAFIFO, 2009).  PSA applications with outstanding 
social security debts are rejected.  Although land under PSA is exempt from property 
tax (payoff rule), a long term effect of PES-driven tenure regularisation may be an 
increase in the tax base once properties leave the PES scheme, hence also an example 
of cross-compliance.   PSA applicants from expropriated properties within national 
parks that remain uncompensated is an example, though less frequent, of cross-
compliance related to a payoff rule. 
 
3.4  PES as a policy mix - combining rules-in-use from different 
instruments and cross-compliance 
Based on the detailed analysis of the Costa Rican PSA as a mix of rules-in-use and 
cross-compliance mechanisms, we demonstrate an example of payments for ecosystem 












Table 5 Costa Rica’s PSA as a policy mix 
 
Indeed, PSA is a combination of characteristics from regulatory, market-based and 
information-based conservation instruments.  PSA is  (1) a voluntary transaction (on 
voluntary private land with title and cadaster maps, as well as some designated public 
land), (2) with conditional compensation payments & sanctions, (3) between service 
providers and users (with multiple overlapping roles), (4) subject to agreed rules of 
natural resource management and cross-compliance, (5) for generating off-site 
environmental services and protecting on-site biodiversity, (6) which is monitored and 
certified (e.g. carbon offsets as part of reductions of emissions from deforestation and 





4.1 Does IAD offer a new perspective on instrument design? 
We have demonstrated that PES and economic instruments in general can be described 
by the IAD framework’s rules-in-use.  We use the framework in an explorative fashion 
for ‘institutional diagnostics’ (Young, 2002), rather than a prescriptive search for 
‘optimal’ design criteria for PSA (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008).  However, 
it is difficult to propose a framework completely free of normative content (Fletcher and 
Buscher, 2017) and the IAD framing is no exception. The IAD framework casts 
instrument analysis in the light of cooperative governance theory. From this perspective 
PES can be discussed as an example of a (hierarchical) cooperative institution – the type 
of institution for which IAD was originally developed. For example, PSA has been 
interpreted by economists as a national political level as a quid pro quo or pre-condition 
for forest stakeholder representatives accepting the land use change ban (Pagiola, 2008; 
Daniels et al., 2010).  Le Coq and colleagues documented the surprisingly wide political 
support across different stakeholder interests for the ban on landuse conversion prior to 
introduction of the Forest Law (Le Coq et al., 2010; Le Coq et al., 2015).  While 
recognising PSAs neoliberal conservation agenda at macro level (Fletcher and Buscher, 
2017), the IAD framework also casts the origins of PSA in the light of cooperative 
governance at national level. 
The IAD framework may also provide an additional perspective on Vatn (2010) or 
Muradian et al. (2010) discussion of trade-offs between efficiency and equity outcomes 
of PES. Muradian et al. (2010) has found that problems in identifying and demarcating 
biodiversity and ecosystem services lead PES managers in different case studies to use 
a combination of criteria to allocate PES. Our rules-in-use diagnostic shows that PSA 
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combines (i) criteria for entering the PES program (boundary rules), (ii) types of 
landuses allowed under PES contracts (choice rules), and (iii) habitat characteristics in 
approximation to conservation goals (scope rules).    
4.3 Are rules-in-use sufficient as functional characteristics of PES? 
Interactions between economic, regulatory and informational instruments in a policy 
mix have been defined as complementary, synergistic, path-dependent, redundant or in 
conflict (Ring and Barton, 2015). A diagnostic of rules-in-use provides a common 
language for defining functional characteristics of instruments, but does not explain the 
quality of the functional interactions between these characteristics.  The focus in IAD is 
on describing institutional ‘structure’, while a balanced policy mix analysis must also 
consider ‘agency’ (Van Hecken et al., 2015; Fletcher and Buscher, 2017).  This is related 
to  how design and transaction costs are increased/reduced by other instruments and the 
practices in use, which are an essential factor to be considered when evaluating 
institutional performance (Bollman and Hardy, 2012; Coggan et al., 2013). For 
example, Matulis (2016) provides a detailed analysis of how the role of forester 
intermediaries  - ‘regentes forestales’ –  developed over time as part of PSA. The law 
defined position rules allowing private forest contractors to administer application, 
contracting and monitoring of PSA. PSA Procedures Manual defines pay-off rules for 
intermediaries’ fees as a fixed maximum percentage of the PSA contract. Over time this 
has led to regentes favouring large landholders because of economies of scale, illicitly 
charging smallholders more than the maximum fixed rates in some cases, and private 
contractors outcompete non-profit NGO intermediaries representing smallholders. This 
dynamic is a result of the interaction of position and pay-off rules, but is not explained 
by the rules per se, but additionally by more active role and agency that can be captured 
by the ‘theory of coercive competition’ (Matulis, 2016). However, rules-in-use provide 
28 
 
a framework for describing the institutional structure as sources of agency and 
transaction costs of PES.   
4.4 PES as a policy mix – avoiding ideal types and ideology? 
Matulis (2012, 2016) argues that PSA is in a process of neoliberalization in terms of 
instrument financing, moving away from tax-financing towards user financing, 
particularly through water user fees; largely fixed monitoring costs and competitive 
contracting of forest regents favouring larger over smaller forest owners (position rules, 
payoff rules); and through the decline in group contracts in favour of individual and 
anonymous society participation (boundary and aggregation rules).   Analysis of PES 
application criteria development over time as boundary rules (Table 4) also reveals 
increased and more detailed regulation in PSA contracting, particularly since 2009. 
There has been more detailed use of spatial priority-setting criteria to generate 
ecosystem services and conservation in accordance with stated policy goals for PSA, in 
contrast to the initial a first-come-first-serve supply determined enrollment.  Payment 
levels in the PSA program continue to be administratively determined, rather than 
demand-supply driven.  For example, PSA payment levels have been maintained in 
nominal terms by decree, but fallen in real terms (Porras et al., 2013).   
There is an undeniable political tension between PSAs voluntary nature, use of 
competitive intermediaries and partial private funding, one the one hand, and public 
funding and public regulation of PSA selection criteria, on the other. We have suggested 
that rules-in-use terminology of IAD framework, provides a language for describing the 
structure of economic instruments for conservation that avoids arguments based on ideal 
types. Implicitly we have been arguing for policy analysis that avoids ideological 
starting points for policy design research.  The IAD’s rules-in-use focuses on instrument 
structure and makes descriptions of instruments more ideologically neutral.   But policy 
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design research must also address policy objectives and the types of agency needed to 
support their achievement (Van Hecken et al., 2015; Fletcher and Buscher, 2017).  This 
requires a complementary set of analytical tools that address political dimensions of 
instruments (Vatn, 2015; Hausknost et al., 2017). 
5. Conclusions 
We use Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and its 
‘rules-in-use’ terminology to describe Costa Rica’s ‘pagos por servicios ambientales’ 
(PSA) program.  We demonstrate how describing payments for ecosystem services 
(PES) in terms of ‘rules-in-use’ accommodates a wide range of definitions that have 
been discussed in the PES literature.   In the case of Costa Rica, through a detailed 
analysis of boundary rules, position rules, choice rules, information rules, aggregation 
rules and pay-off rules, we demonstrate an interpretation of PSA as a policy mix in itself, 
rather than a single instrument. Our analysis illustrates that the ‘rules-in-use’ of the IAD 
framework offers a terminology that can be used to compare the structure of economic, 
regulatory and informational instruments in terms of functional characteristics – 
characteristics that can explain instrument interactions.    The rules-in-use terminology 
also offers greater precision regarding what is understood as the institutional context of 
PES, bridging literatures on economic instrument design and environmental 
governance. The rules-in-use terminology does not explain the quality of interactions - 
complementarity, synergy, path-dependence, redundancy or conflict - between rules and 
between instruments.  However, the IAD framework provides a consistent terminology 
for the decomposition of instrument characteristics for future comparative policy 
research in environmental conservation. 
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Table S1 documents types of cadastral inconsistencies mapped by the IDB cadastre project in 
Costa Rica (BID CR0134 Regularización de Catastro y Registro).  Benavides et al. (2014) 
evaluated the possible implications for PSA pre-applications if FONAFIFO have information 
on these cadastral inconsistencies, shown in the colour coding.  The cadastre developed by the 
IDB Project is not currently applied systematically by FONAFIFO to assess pre-applications 
because the cadastre lacks complete national coverage, but is used when and where available 
at the time of assessing pre-applications. 
Table S1 Boundary rules of an information-based instrument - cadastral inconsistencies 
and their implications for PSA pre-application process in Costa Rica 
 
Source: Benavides et al. (2014)  
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